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On January 14, 1637, kimelaha Leliato, the govcmor of the Tematan 
dependencies in Central Maluku, returned to his headquarters in Lusicla 
on Hoamoal from an expedition to Sapama with his hongi of 30 kora-
kora. The reason for his sudden rctum was that he had just received a 
message from Bum informing him of the approach of a large Dutch 
fleet. That fleet was under the supreme command of Governor-General 
Anthonic van Diemcn, the highest official in the hierarchy in Asia of the 
Verenigde Oost-Indischc Compagnie (VOC), the Dutch East India 
Company. The reason for Van Diemcn's arrival in the islands was the 
crisis confrdnting VOC mlc there. For many years, since the Dutch had 
taken over a portion of the islands from the Pottugucsc in 1605, there 
had been a state of war or, at best, of anned peace with the Tcmatan 
dependencies in the same area. However, for the past few years the VOC 
had seen itself also confronted with growing opposition from the 
territories located between the Tcmatan and Dutch realms. Finally, in 
1636, rebellion broke out among the inhabitants of the VOC's own do-
main, who had hitherto mostly supported the Dutch cause with their 
kora-kora in the hongi (Knaap 1987a: 17-22; Enkhuizen 399:2-3, 16). 
One might say that the events of 1636-1637 were the severest crisis 
the Dutch had been confronted with until that time. It would be almost 
two hundred years before a crisis of such magnitude occutTed again: the 
1817 Pattimura uprising. So, there was every reason for the Dutch to 
send a large fleet and an important person possessing enough authority 
to deal with the situation. We will see how the crisis developed and how 
Van Diemen succeeded in his object of appeasing the Clu-istians and, for 
the time being, the territories in between, thus isolating his Tcmatan 
enemy, kimelaha Lcliato. In the meantime, we will try to find out the 
factors that made the anti-Dutch front a fai lure. This reconstmction of 
the events and developments will make ample use of a recently 
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rediscovered manuscript giving a day-to-day account of Van Diemen's 
expedition. 1 
The Dutch in Ambon's Political Landscape Prior to 1636 
When the Dutch reached Maluku around 1600, they were warmly 
welcomed by the Ternatans, both in the center of the kingdom in North 
Maluku as well as in its outlying districts, such as Hoamoal and the 
islands to the west of it. The reason for this was the Ternatan-Portuguese 
rivalry, which had resulted in an almost permanent state of warfare from 
about 1570 onward. The Dutch, who presented themselves as arch-
enemies of the Iberians-both Portuguese and Spanish-seemed quite 
natural allies for the Ternatans. The Ternatans wanted the well-equipped 
Dutch to attack the Porhtguese. The Dutch were in principle prepared to 
do so, on the condition that they were given the right to buy up all cloves 
that were grown in the area. In 1605, the Dutch took over the Portuguese 
dependencies in the Ambon Islands and also destroyed their strongholds 
in North Maluku. One year later, however, in 1606, the Spanish took up 
arms for the Iberian cause and occupied a considerable part of the island 
of Tcrnate. As a consequence, the Sultan of Ternatc, Mudafar, renewed 
the alliance with the Dutch in 1607, promising them an exclusive right to 
buy cloves. At the instigation of Mudafar, in 1609 a treaty between 
Hoamoal and the VOC was signed in which the sole right to buy cloves 
in that area was also conceded (Heeres 1907:51-53, 70-72; Knaap 
l987a: 17). 
However, this idyllic situation did not last long. The Sultan, menaced 
by the Spaniards on his own doorstep, was usually loyal to the treaties 
concluded with the Dutch. In the periphery of the kingdom on the other 
hand, notably on Hoamoal, which gradually developed into the principal 
production center for cloves, circumstances went the other way. As time 
went by, an ever-widening gap grew between the Dutch on the one hand, 
demanding all cloves, and the indigenous producers demanding higher 
prices on the other. Several producers on Hoamoal secretly sold part of 
their harvest to Javanese and other traders, who were prepared to pay 
more and to offer better merchandise in return than the Dutch. The Dutch 
reacted by intercepting Javanese and other trading vessels on the excuse 
of trying to prevent the "smuggling" of cloves. This process of 
polarization tlu-eatencd the position of the successive kimelaha, who 
were not from Hoamoal but members of the aristocratic family of 
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Tomagola from Tcrnatc. They had to choose between their own loyalty 
to the Sultan and supp01ting the cause of their subjects on Hoamoal. 
Consequently, during the government of kimelaha Sabadin, 1611-1619, 
there were attempts by certain discontented sections of the population to 
get rid of Ternatan overlordship. Moreover, the kimelaha was threatened 
by the Dutch, who questioned Temate's claims to a large part of the 
Ambon Islands in order to lend extra legitimation to their interceptions 
of foreign traders. Furthermore, the VOC obstructed the kimelaha's 
islamization policies, in particular on mainland Scram (Ticle 1886:195, 
226,251, 256-257; Rumphius 1910:38). 
During the government of kimelaha Hidayat, 1619-1623, local 
Ternatan authority in the Ambon Islands chose a clear anti-Dutch policy. 
However, there was not yet any actual fighting between the forces of the 
kimelaha and the Dutch. This changed after Lcliato succeeded Hidayat 
as kimelaha in 1623. After over a year of small incidents, the Dutch 
launched a full-scale attack on the kim elaha's positions in 1625. The 
local VOC garrison and the Christian Ambonese hongi were temporarily 
reinforced by ships from the so-called "Nassau" fleet. The kimelaha's 
main stronghold, Gamasongi, was quickly ovenun by the Dutch, who 
also destroyed tens of thousands of clove trees, a number of vi llagcs, and 
many sea-going vessels. However, Leliato and his party withdrew into 
the interior, waiting for better times (Ticlc & Heeres 1890:48-70; 
Rumph ius 191 0:51-52). One year later, in 1626, Lelia to and the Dutch 
concluded an armistice. At about the same time, Leliato started building 
a new headquarters in LusiCla. In 1628, with the help of kaicili Ali from 
Temate, peace was officially restored, on which occasion the VOC was 
again granted the right to buy up all cloves. Another member of the 
Tomagola family, named Luhu, was nominated as the new kimelaha but 
Leliato refused to give up his position and remained on Hoa1~1oal 
(Rumphius 1910:55, 58, 66, 72). In 1630, kimelaha Luhu and Leliato 
came to an agreement to rule Hoamoal and surrounding areas together. 
Consequently, the trade of foreigners that was undermining the Dutch 
monopoly received new impetus. The Dutch resumed their interception 
policy with the result that from the end of 1632, war between Hoamoal 
and the VOC was raging once again, with both sides attacking each other 
with their respective hongi (Rumphius 1910:76, 80, 92, 93, 95, 100, 
102-1 03). With the exception of part of the village of Luhu, Hoamoal 
closed ranks completely behind Lcliato. In 1635, the VOC launched a 
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full-scale attack on Lusiela, but the attempt failed. The Dutch leaders of 
the expedition were said to have chosen a bad route in their assault on 
the place, where about 400 Makassarese fighters armed with firearms 
assisted Lcliato. In that same year kimelaha Luhu withdrew temporarily 
to Ternate, leaving Leliato to deal with the dramatic developments to 
come (Tiele & Heeres 1890:280; Rumphius 1910:106, I 15, 124, 140). 
The Islamic territories between the domains of the VOC and the 
kimelaha-Hitu, Hatuhaha and Ihamahu--of which Hitu was the most 
important, were more or less independent states. According to the 
treaties concluded between them and the Dutch, on paper they could be 
considered as almost vassal or "satellite" states. They promised the 
Dutch a clove monopoly and the performance of compulsory services. 
Furthermore, they took an oath of obedience to the States General of the 
Dutch Republic, the Prince of Orange, and the VOC Governor of 
Ambon. In internal matters of an administrative, judicial, or religious 
nature, they were entirely free (Heeres 1907:31-33, 58, 59, 170-1~2). 
Although in theory subjects of the Dutch, these entities still acted fa1rly 
independently in practical matters concerning "foreign policy." 
Like the Ternatans, the Hituese had warmly welcomed the Dutch 
because of their anti-Portuguese sentiment. During the rule of kapitan 
Hitu Tepil, 1602-1633, Dutch-Hituese relations were fairly good, 
among other reasons because Tepil himself realized that European 
military power was a phenomenon that might prove fatal to every 
indigenous state that challenged it. He had experienced this himself in 
the year 1602, when the Hituese had suffered a terrible defeat at the 
hands of a Portuguese expeditionary force under the command of Andrea 
Furtado de Mendonya. The Dutch, for their part, saw Tepil as an 
influential person whose cooperation was indispensable for the stability 
of the region . Although there were situations that could easily have 
provoked open conflict between Hitu and the VOC, such as the price of 
cloves free access of foreign Asian traders, and control over a number of 
villagds in the western part of the island of Ambon, such as Larike, 
Wakasihu, Tapi, Uring, and Asilulu, relations generally remained cordial 
(Tiele 1886:211-212, 223; Knaap 1987b:8, 18). Around 1630, however, 
Tepil's policy was being questioned by many Hituese, in particular by 
those villages in the eastern part of the area, which gathered on 
Kapahaha around Samusamu, another member of Hitu's elite (Rumphius 
1910:69; Knaap 1987b:82-87). 
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Because of its strategic and economic importance, the Dutch kept a 
close watch on Hitu, using every occasion to gain more influence in the 
country's internal affairs. These occasions occurred in particular when-
ever a member of the ruling elite passed away and a successor had to be 
nominated (Knaap 1987b:84-85). Such an opportunity presented itself 
on the death of Tepil in April 1633. According to Rumphius, the 
deceased had preferred his younger brother, Latu Lisalaik, as his 
successor, an opinion that seems in line with a certain passage in the 
Hikayat Tanah Hitu. However, to avoid further concentration of power 
in the hands of one person, the Dutch managed to divide Tepil's 
functions between the three major competitors for succession: Latu 
Lisalaik became village chief of Hila only, while another brother, Barus, 
became chief of the Nusatapi clan, which automatically made him one of 
the four perdana who traditionally ruled the country. Finally, Tepil's 
oldest surviving son, Kakiali, became kapitan Hitu . The position of 
kapitan Hitu was the most prestigious and influential one in Hitu's 
corporate leadership (Rumphius 1910:96; Manusama 1977:59, 60, 126, 
128). Kakiali soon departed on an anti-Dutch plot, cooperating with the 
kimelaha and pinning his hopes on a coalition with the then fast-
expanding power of the sultanate of Makassar. In order to stop these 
developments, in May 1634 Govcmor Anthonie van den Heuvel carried 
out the surprise arrest of twelve prominent leaders of Hitu, including 
Kakiali. Kakiali was accused of trying to join in an anti-Dutch coalition. 
Within a few days, all the arrested leaders, with the exception of Kakiali 
and Tamalesi, village chief of Wakal, were released. Kakiali and 
Tamalesi were kept in jail. In 1636 (not toward the end of 1635 as 
Rumphius erroneously states) they were transported to Batavia. In the 
meantime, because of resentment at the Dutch intervention, almost the 
entire land of Hitu had risen to stand against the Dutch (Rumphius 
1910:104-105, 114-116, 124; VOC 1116:188v- 189r). 
Hatuhaha on the island of Hamku was the smallest of the territories 
in between. Like Hitu, at the begitming of the century Hatuhaha had 
already promised the VOC all the cloves it produced, as well as the 
performance of compulsory services in retum for protection (Rumph ius 
1910:30; Heeres 1907:58, 59). Relations between Hatuhaha and the 
VOC were generally cordial, except for a short period from 1619-1621 
when it had sided with the kimelaha. However, around 1630 relations 
deteriorated again. In 1632, Hatuhaha decided to retreat to its fortified 
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strongholds inland, refusing the VOC any further deliveries of cloves or 
men to row in the hongi (Tiele 1886:261; Rump hi us 1910:46, 90). 
At the beginning of the century, the third area, Ihamahu on Saparua, 
was not a clove-producing area. It was a conglomerate of craftsmen and 
seafarers gathered in a strategically located and fairly inaccessible moun-
tain-fortress. In 1610, the first serious conflict with the Dutch occutTed 
when Ihamahu raided Rutung, a Christian village on Leitimor which fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Dutch. Like Hatuhaha, Ihamahu was recon-
ciled with the Dutch in 1621, on the occasion of a visit by Governor-
General Jan Pietersz. Coen to Ambon. It even joined in a general oath of 
allegiance to the Dutch (Rumph ius 1910:31, 4 7; Manusama 1983:97-
1 00). However, after that Ihamahu systematically refused to row in the 
VOC's hongi, and around 1630 relations were strained again. Ihamahu 
became a place of refuge for that section of the population of the Dutch 
part of Saparua who had conflicts with their own village chiefs. In 1631 
Ihamahu even took the offensive, killing several Christian inhabitants 
and destroying Itawaka. One year later, the Ambonese hongi under 
Dutch command blockaded Ihamahu and devastated the surrounding 
countryside. This forced lhamahu to conclude a temporary armistice 
(Rumphius 1910:73, 82, 84-86, 90). 
When the Dutch took over the fortress of Nossa Senhora de 
Anunciada in Kota Ambon on February 23, 1605, all Roman Catholic 
villages on the island of Ambon and in the Lease Islands-Haruku, 
Saparua, and Nusalaut-swore obedience to the Prince of Orange, the 
States General, and the VOC. Within a few years, relations with the new 
overlords were more or less "normalized": the Roman Catholics became 
Protestants, just like the Dutch themselves, and in 1607 the first hongi 
under Dutch rule was sent out. In the first decades of the seventeenth 
century, cloves were not yet being produced on a large scale. In the 
Christian part of the Lease Islands, clove production only took off 
around 1630 (Knaap 1987a:85, 147, 231, 232; Knaap 1987b:4). 
Consequently, there were few difficulties between the VOC and the 
Christian Ambonese about the price of cloves. Nevertheless, other 
conflicts occurred. First, there was a conflict with the village of 
Hutumuri on Leitimor, which was, according to the Dutch, involved in 
acts of "piracy." In 1618, the Dutch finally defeated and subjugated 
Hutumuri. Second, in 1616-1617 there was an arn1ed conflict on 
Leitimor between the Dutch on the one hand, and Soya, Kilang, and 
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Ema and their dependent villages on the other. The reasons for the revolt 
were the excessive demands for compulsory labor and the fact that Soya, 
Kilang, and Ema were not given a seat in the newly constituted 
Landraad. The Landraad was the council of Ambonese village chiefs 
that functioned as a court of justice for the indigenous population as well 
as a board of advisers for the Dutch administrators on local political 
matters (Tiele 1886:196-199; Rumphius 1910:31,34-35, 37). 
Peace was restored in 1617 by reducing the level of compulsory labor 
and the installation of a Landraad, in which all prominent village chiefs 
of Lei timor and the southern, Christian, part of the Hitu peninsula were 
given a seat. In the Lease, it appeared to be the island of Nusalaut that 
felt most strongly attracted to the anti-Dutch camp, joining the side of 
Ihamahu, Hatuhaha, and the kimelaha during the years 1619-1621 (Tiele 
1886:200, 226, 261, 311; Rumph ius 1910:35-36, 46). In the 1620s, the 
relations between the Christian Ambonese and the Dutch proved fairly 
harmonious once again. However, around 1630 the Dutch were stepping 
up compulsory labor on the hongi. This was a result of the arrival of an 
increasing number of Makassarese trading vessels in search of cloves. 
The Dutch needed the hongi to intercept these vessels. Moreover, 
hostilities with the kimelaha and Ihamahu were gradually being resumed. 
Consequently, during the period 1630-1635, the Christian hongi had to 
sail two to three times a year instead of the traditional once. As time 
went by, the population became rather annoyed at this situation. Finally, 
in February 1636, the Dutch saw themselves confronted with widespread 
rebellion, both on the island of Ambon itself as well as in the Lease. 
Rumph ius called this the beginning of the "Third Ambonese War," that 
is, the war of the VOC against the entire archipelago of Amboina 
(Rumph ius 1910:80-81, 89, 99, 125). 
The Dutch Under Pressure 
In July 1636, Arend Gardenijs, a high-ranking official of the VOC, made 
a reconstruction of what had happened before the rebellion broke out. A 
few village chiefs declared that the primary reason for discontent was the 
hongi, which had been sent out too often during the last few years. The 
population was not allowed enough time to give proper attention to its 
agricultural means of subsistence. On top of this, while serving on the 
hongi, many Ambonese, including village chiefs, fell victim to maltreat-
ment by the supervising Dutch soldiers and officers on board. They were 
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obliged to row for excessively long spells. In addition, the Amboncse 
were called "dogs," "pigs," "devils," and so forth by these Dutchmen, 
who also frequently used physical violence. Those on board were beaten 
with rattan sticks, and had shoes thrown at them, while their food was 
often spoiled. The village chiefs of Waay and Baguale were temporarily 
put in chains because their kora-kora had stayed too far behind. During 
the last journey with the hongi, toward the end of 1635, several 
Amboncse leaders joined in a conspiracy to murder the principal Dutch 
offenders. However, this plan was not put into effect. Around the tum of 
the year a general process of mutual consultation about what should be 
done took place among Christian villages on Ambon and Lease, as well 
as with the Moslems of Larike, Wakasihu, Tapi, and a few Hituese 
chiefs. The kimelaha sent his envoys to fan the flames, while the 
Governor, Jochum Roclofsz. van Deutecom, a rather ill-mannered 
character, was unaware of what was going on. After a while, most 
subjects of the VOC decided to swear a traditional oath, a matakau, of 
mutual alliance against the Dutch (Knaap 1987b: 142-144; Rumphius 
1910:124, 125). 
According to Gardenijs, even after taking this oath, the Christian 
Ambonese were still in search of extra motives for abandoning their 
loyalty to the Dutch. In the middle of January 1636, the Reverend Jacob 
Vertrecht, apparently for purely religious reasons, started to take a 
census among the Christian population on Leitimor. After objections 
from the village chiefs of Kilang and Ema, Governor van Dcutccom 
ordered Vertrecht to stop this initiative. At the end of January, upon the 
arrival of the Company's ship Buyren, a rumor spread that this ship was 
laden with a great number of chains, ropes, and handcuffs meant for the 
arrest and dep01tation of most Ambonesc to Batavia. People were afraid 
of sharing the same fate that had befallen the Bandancse of Lontor 
fifteen years earlier. Now, Vcrtrccht's census came to be looked upon as 
a preparation for large-scale deportation. On top of this, the rumor spread 
that the rulers of Mataram and Butung had attacked the VOC and that 
the Makassarese, in cooperation with the Butungesc, the Iberians, 
English, and Danish, were planning to invade Central Maluku, which 
was considered an attack the Dutch would not be capable of 
withstanding. When the Governor invited the village chiefs to attend a 
celebration in the church on February 23 to commemorate the Dutch 
conquest, most of the villages in the vicinity of Victoria, the Dutch 
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castle in Kota Ambon, decided to evacuate themselves to the 
mountainous hinterland. Finally, at the beginning of April, the villages 
definitively refused to join the hongi yet again. All roads and paths in 
the interior were blockaded and guarded. Only Nusaniwe, Latuhalat, 
Hatiwe, Tawiri, and Mardika, with a few of their subordinate villages, 
remained loyal to the Dutch. Kilang, Ema, Urimesen, and after some 
hesitation, Soya and Halong, rebelled (Knaap 1987b:141-142, 144-146). 
Elsewhere on the island of Ambon the situation was no different. The 
people of Baguale remained in their village, but those of Hutumuri, 
Waay, and Suli fled to the mountainside. However, the chiefs of the 
three latter villages stayed in contact with the Dutch, therein following 
the example of the chief of Halong. From May onward, Alang and 
Lilibooy refused to acknowledge the authority of the VOC, joining the 
Moslems from Wakasihu, Tapi, Uring, and Asilulu in their anti-Dutch 
efforts. Consequently, in the western comer of Ambon Island, Larike 
was the only village that remained loyal to the VOC. At the end of June 
and the beginning of July, most of the rebellious villages besieged 
Larike and the small VOC fortress there. During this siege, they 
collaborated with an expeditionary force from Hoamoal and adjacent 
islands under the command of Latukoli from Lcsidi . Gardenijs states that 
this Latukoli was from Kambclo, but this is a mistake.2 However, after a 
few weeks the siege was broken off (Knaap 1987b: 145- 147; VOC 
1124:218v). From August on, Alang and Lilibooy showed some 
inclination to reconcile themselves to the VOC. In August, Waay, Suli, 
and Baguale were said to have performed a special ceremony to ban 
from their villages the anti-Dutch matakau, to which they had previously 
sworn. In these villages, the process of reconciliation had set in as early 
as April (Colenbrander 1899b:231; VOC 1124:209v, 223v). 
On Haruku, the Christian villages had already retired to their fortified 
strongholds inland at the end of Febmary. Within a few months they, 
with the assistance of the kimelaha, besieged the VOC fortress near 
Oma, which was soon in a vety precarious situation. Nonetheless, the 
fortress held out. On Saparua most of the Christian villages maintained 
contact with the Dutch, at least until the middle of the year. After that, 
loyalty to the Dutch was only preserved by Ulat, Tuhaha, Haria, and 
Porto. The most welcome reception of the kimelaha was by the 
Christians of Nusalaut, in particular by Amet and its subordinate 
villages. They provided the kimelaha with guides for the extermination 
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of the small Dutch garrison in Hatumeten in South Seram. Furthcm1orc, 
the Christians of Nusalaut turned Moslem and demolished all churches 
and everything that reminded them of the hated Dutch. In August they 
even captured the Reverend Jan Pricerius, whose ship was accidentally 
stranded on Nusalaut. Deprived of all his possessions, the Reverend 
Pricerius was released by his captors on a beach on Saparua about one 
month later, despite the kimelaha's demands to hand him over 
(Rumphius 1910:126, 127; Knaap 1987b:147, 148). 
What was happening in Hitu at the time of these dramatic develop-
ments in the VOC's own territories? Kakiali and Tamalesi were still held 
captive. Kakiali's principal opponent, Kayoan, perdana Tanahit11mcscn 
and recently nominated as provisional kapitan Hitu, went to Batavia in 
the company of several other leaders to try to get Kakiali released. 
Kayoan did so because he realized that Kakiali's release was the only 
way of restoring unity and peace in the land of Hitu. However, when 
Kayoan returned to Ambon at the beginning of 1636, he appears to have 
been once more nominated as kapitan Hitu, this time by the Governor-
General himself. Another surprising fact was the nomination of Latu 
Lisalaik, who already held the honorary title of orangkaya Bulang, to 
perdana Nusatapi, in the place of his brother Barus. Latu Lisalaik was 
not at all happy with his new appointment; he openly refused to accept 
it. In a conversation with the local authorities of the VOC at the end of 
April he declared that the Govemor-General did not have any right to 
nominate members of the govemment in Hitu, just as he himself did not 
have the right to promote the Dutch Governor of Ambon to be a king. 
With the exception of the closest followers of Tanahitumesen and Latu 
Lisalaik, the population of Hitu remained in their inland strongholds and 
did not want to have anything to do with the Dutch. Toward the end of 
1636, Latu Lisalaik headed a second delegation from Hihl to Batavia to 
secure the release of Kakiali (Colenbrander 1899a:232; Knaap 
1987b:l40, 141, 149-151). 
The second part of the year saw the Dutch and their small number of 
allies continuing to defend themselves against the offensive actions of 
their adversaries. These actions usually took the form of headhunting. 
Frontal attacks were hardly ever launched. In Hitu and on Leitimor, 
things remained unchanged. Both Hitu and Leitimor were willing to be 
supplied with gunpowder and receive other support from the kimelaha, 
while at the same time trying to stay as independent as possible. The 
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chiefs of Leitimor visited Lusicla, but apparently did not swear 
obedience to the kimelaha. Lcliato seems to have been aware of this 
problem, because in a letter to the Christians he urged them to get rid of 
the Dutch, not to become subjects of somebody else, but to become "free 
persons, who were subject to nobody and acted according to their own 
wishes." Likewise, both the Leitimorese and a large number of the 
Hituese refused to deliver their cloves to Leliato. Instead, they kept them 
in store, in case they needed some "change" for whenever the Dutch 
might recover (VOC 1124:230v, 232v, 233v, 236v). Neve1iheless, 
toward the end of the year, Leliato sent out his hongi and put new 
pressure on the pro-Dutch villages in Lease. He attacked Tuhaha and 
Ulat, but did not succeed in taking them. However, 1637 would bring 
other developments. In July 1636, Arend Gardenijs had already advised 
the High Govemmcnt in Batavia that the best remedy would be the 
personal intervention of the highest-ranking official of the VOC, the 
Govemor-Gencral himself. Anthonie van Dicmcn took this advice. The 
beginning of 1637 saw his arrival in the Ambon Islands with a fleet of 
seventeen capital ships carrying about 2000 sailors and soldiers. Kakiali 
and Tamalesi were also on board (Rumphius 1910: 127, 128, 131; Knaap 
1987b:l53, 154). 
Van Diemen in Ambon 
Van Dicmen arrived in Central Maluku, more specifically Buru, on 
January 13 afler a voyage of two weeks. It would be another five days 
before the fleet reached Tanjung Sial, the southernmost point of 
Hoamoal. By then, Van Diemen had already decided to make an 
immediate assault on Lusiela. The soldiers who were to be deployed in 
the action against the kimelaha's stronghold were once more instructed 
to follow the orders of their officers, not to leave the troop and to go 
ashore well armed and well dressed. Looting, burning, murdering, and 
raping were explicitly prohibited and would be punished by death, unless 
the officers gave permission to do so. In the evening of January 19, the 
fleet anchored off Lusiela, which was ach1ally a complex of several 
fortresses on different levels. A reconnaissance party was sent out to find 
a proper landing site, while Kayoan, the Dutch-nominated kapitan Hitu, 
and Abdul Rachman, a pro-Dutch leader from Luhu, the principal village 
on Hoamoal, revealed the paths around Lusicla. In the meantime, the 
Dutch witnessed great activity in and around Lusicla caused by people 
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trying to escape (Enkhuizen 399:2,7, 8, 10-13, 16, 17). 
The next day, January 20, after breakfast and a blessing by the 
Reverend, a force of 1525 men disembarked on a beach about half an 
hour's march from Lusiela. The defenders, who were few in number, a 
few hundred at the most, responded briskly by firing their cam1on and 
muskets, shooting arrows, and tluowing spears and stones, but were not 
able to halt the advancing Dutch. After the Dutch had managed to climb 
the walls of the lowest fortress with bamboo ladders, all defenders gave 
up and fled inland. The Dutch removed the red and white banners and 
garrisoned the place with their own men. Within five hours mighty 
Lusiela had fallen. Inside the fortress, the Dutch found the bodies of only 
two enemy dead as well as about 20 pieces of light artillery and 3000 
lbs. of gunpowder. Furthe1more, there is mention of two captives, one 
being a woman, and 125 boats, most of them small, captured on the 
beach. All but one of these vessels were destroyed to be used as 
firewood. The VOC had suffered 10 dead and 38 wounded, a few of 
whom later succumbed to their wounds (Enkhuizen 399:20-27). In the 
days after the victory, the Dutch were busy demolishing pmt of the 
fortress and destroying the surrounding area, in particular the clove 
plantations. On January 27, Van Dicmcn left LusiC!a, leaving there a 
garrison of 400 soldiers and five capital ships in the roadstead 
(Enkhuizen 399:29,31-35, 41). 
It took the fleet three days to reach Castle Victoria in Kota Ambon. 
After a reception by the highest-ranking Company officials and 
inspection of the garrison and the militias, Van Dicmen settled himself 
in the castle. He found there several village chiefs from Lcitimor and the 
southeastern part of Hitu peninsula. About a week before, Governor van 
Dcutecom had ordered the rebellious Christian villages to come down 
from their strongholds and seck the pardon of the Governor-General. 
However, there had been no reaction. It would be February 6 before a 
message came from the rebellious Leitimorese. It was said that the 
leaders of Soya, Kilang, Ema, and Urimescn were gathered in Soya to 
deliberate about their coming down, but they needed time. On that same 
day, a messenger from the village of Hatiwe returned from Lilibooy and 
Alang. He had not been able to make any serious contact (Enkhuizcn 
399:33,34,42-47,5 1-53). 
It was in the same western corner of Hitu peninsula that the Company 
took its next initiative. As soon as Van Dierncn had arrived in Victoria, 
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the imam of Larike requested vengeance for the burning down of his 
village and the killing of some of its inhabitants the previous October by 
people from Wakasihu, Tapi, Uring, Asilulu, and Alang. On February 6, 
Governor van Deutccom set sail for Larike with a force of 10 vessels and 
700 men. Two days later, this force took the inland fortresses of 
Wakasihu and Tapi, which had been hurriedly evacuated by the 
defenders. On February I 0, van Deutecom returned to the castle. 
However, further attempts to restore peace in this area failed. Alang in 
particular showed itself strongly opposed to sending its envoys and 
asking pardon from the VOC (Enkhuizen 399:48, 53, 54, 58, 60, 72, 92). 
Further to the northeast, the villages of Baguale, Suli, and Waay 
maintained their reconciliat01y attitude toward the Dutch. On February 
17 and 18, Van Dicmen and other high-ranking officials, accompanied 
by their families, even paid a visit to Baguale (Enkhuizen 399:75, 76). 
During February, most energy was devoted to the reconciliation of 
the rebellious villages on Leitimor. Van Diemen played the role of the 
powerful but generous overlord, who granted everybody pardon 
regardless of what serious offenses they may have committed agai nst the 
Dutch and their allies. Several delegations passed up and down between 
the interior and Victoria. Luis Gomes, village chief of Mardika, acted as 
the most prominent mediator. Soya, Kilang, Ema, Urimesen, and 
Hutumuri replied that they were inclined to come down, but that they, 
according to Ambonese "custom," needed time to discuss the matter 
internally as well as with those other villages in Ambon and the Lease 
with which they claimed to have sworn a "strong" matakau of mutual 
alliance. On February 14, Van Diemen sent a letter to Soya and its allies 
in which he urgently demanded that the village chiefs come and meet 
him before the 21st. However, Soya and its allies once more tried to 
postpone the meeting. Furthern1ore, they requested that the village chiefs 
who had remained Joyal to the Dutch meet them halfway up the road 
under a certain beringin tree in order to accompany them to the 
Governor-General. Van Diemen refused to postpone the date for the 
meeting, but allowed the reception at the beringin tree. However, 
because of heavy rains, the plam1ed meeting at the tree failed to take 
place on the 21st. A second attempt on the 22nd also failed because of 
mutual distrust (Enkhuizen 399:57, 58, 68- 71, 73, 74, 78, 79). 
After a new ultimatum, the Leitimorese village chiefs finally came 
down to Van Diemen on February 25. After explaining why they had run 
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away to their mountain strongholds the year before, they asked pardon of 
the Governor-General. A general pardon was subsequently granted, on 
which occasion Van Diemen took the opportunity to say that all that had 
passed was "buried in the darkness of the sea." The village chiefs 
explicitly denied having sworn matakau with the kimelaha and having 
delivered their cloves to him. These matters being resolved, Van Diemen 
departed from Victoria on February 27 to set sail to Haruku. He was 
accompanied by ten VOC ships and three kora-kora. Within two weeks, 
five more kora-kora from Leitimor would follow. Because of difficult 
navigation in narrow waters, it was sunset on March 5 before Van 
Diemen anchored off Hatuhaha. On that date, a group of 170 Alifuru 
warriors from Sumit and Sahulau on Seram also arrived to assist the 
Dutch in their actions by making the conditions around Hatuhaha so 
unsafe that the defenders no longer dared to venture out of their 
strongholds (Enkhuizen 399:81-87, 90, 94, 95, 97, 100). 
The Dutch quickly disembarked a force of over 1000 men. After 
climbing a difficult road uphill, the troops took the well-fortified but 
empty and undefended Kabau, the first of Hatuhaha's strongholds. A 
little further inland they struck at Kailolo, which was fiercely defended. 
Nonetheless, the Dutch managed to take it. After spending the night in 
Kabau, the soldiers resumed their expedition inland on March 6. And so 
they reached the perfectly situated and extremely well-fortified Alaka, 
which was defended by about 1000 men. After the first actions against 
Alaka, the Dutch commanding officers came to the conclusion that it 
would be impossible to take this mighty stronghold without considerable 
loss of men. Consequently, they decided to retire to Kabau. Moreover, 
the rain was pouring down, making operations especially difficult. That 
day, the Dutch lost 14 men, in addition to about 50 wounded. Now the 
Dutch decided to destroy all clove and fruit trees in the neighborhood 
and to have the Alifuru, whose number had grown to over 200 persons, 
employ their guerrilla tactics. Within one week, the number of Alifuru 
had further increased to over 400. On March 15, the Dutch destroyed 
their encampment in Kabau and embarked on the fleet again. Three days 
later the Alifuru, after killing 16 enemies in all, were given permission to 
return to Seram (Enkhuizen 399: 100-108, 116, 118, 120, 122). 
While the fleet was still anchored between Ambon and Haruku, Van 
Diemen launched a diplomatic offensive to reconcile the villages on 
Haruku. During February, the five Christian villages had been in contact 
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with the rebellious villages on Leitimor about whether or not they should 
make peace with the Dutch. After the fleet had anchored off Hatuhaha, 
the Christians had sent several envoys to the small Dutch fortress near 
Oma to make known their inclination to make peace and seek pardon. 
They requested that Manuel Quelju, village chief of Kilang, should act 
as an intermediary. Accompanied by several other Leitimorese village 
chiefs, Manuel Quelju started conciliatory negotiations on March 21. 
Four days later, the Christian chiefs of Haruku visited Van Diemcn on 
board his flagship. They were granted pardon. On that occasion, they 
presented Van Diemen with their services to appease Hatuhaha as well. 
On the 27th, Hatuhaha passed on a message by way of Laurens Ririasa, 
chief of Aboro, that it wanted to make peace because Hatuhaha believed 
that, in the end, it would not be able to withstand the Dutch. Next day a 
delegation from Hatuhaha was granted an audience and pardon. It told 
Van Diemcn that the defenders of Alaka had almost given up the fi ght 
when the Dutch attacked the place on March 6. However, the rain had 
saved the day (Enkhuizen 399:87, 114, 115, 127, 134, 135, 137-140). 
On March 29, Van Diemen's fleet departed from Haruku and set sail 
for Saparua. On April 4, Van Diemen arrived at the VOC's fortress in 
Sirisori. While still on board with the fleet, he had already started to take 
a closer look at the relations on Saparua and Nusalaut (Enkhuizen 
399:141, 147). In December 1636, kimelaha Leliato had attacked Tuhaha 
on Saparua with his hongi. However, the chief of Tuhaha, Pieter or 
Pedro Mahubesi, had put the corpses of a pig and a dog into the small 
river that the kimelaha's hongi was using for drinking water. Confronted 
with such shrewd resistance, the kimelaha had sailed away. When Van 
Diemen was still at Victoria, the other Christian village chiefs from 
Saparua had visited him there in order to swear allegiance again. As far 
as the Christians on Saparua were conccmed, Van Diemen's only task 
was to give presents and compliments to the chief of Tuhaha and to 
witness the return to Christianity of the most prominent dissident of 
Tuhaha, a certain Labo or Lobo (Enkhuizcn 399:47, 55, 59, 152, 164). 
While Van Diemen was on his way to Haruku, the people of Ihamahu 
had inquired about his purpose in coming to Ambon. As the result of 
warlike actions from Ulat, Ihamahu had just lost one of its principal 
leaders, the chief of Nolot. Seeing the great power of the Dutch, 
Ihamahu soon expressed its readiness to make peace. When Van Diemcn 
sailed from Haruku to Saparua, warriors from Paperu ambushed and 
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killed several other members of the leadership of Ihamahu who were 
returning home from a voyage to Hatuhaha. Later on, those from 
Ihamahu would claim that the purpose of this mission had been to make 
peace with Van Dicmen in Hatuhaha. However, the delegation, noting 
that Van Dicmcn just departed for Saparua, decided to go home. In the 
vicinity of Hulaliu, they were tragically attacked by Paperu's warriors. 
Once on Saparua, Van Diemen sent an ultimatum to Ihamahu stating that 
they should make peace within five or six days. On April 7, 
accompanied by Hennan, chief of Sirisori, a delegation from Ihamahu 
visited the Governor-General to restore peace with the VOC. Both 
parties decided that the official reconciliation should take place at the 
/anddag, the general meeting for the entire land of Ambon, which was 
being planned at Castle Victoria for the following month (Enkhuizcn 
399:117, 118, 136,146, 147, 149-151). 
During the crisis, Nusalaut had been very anti-Dutch, especially those 
villages belonging to the uli (a federation of villages) of Inalohu headed 
by the village of Amet. From the beginning, there had been considerable 
contact between Nusalaut and the rebellious villages on Lcitimor. On 
April 1, villagers from Nusalaut's other uli, Inahaha, headed by the chief 
ofTitaway, came on board Van Diemen's ship to ask pardon, which was 
granted to them after many a reprimand about their disloyalty to the 
Dutch and the Protestant religion . Three days later, a delegation from 
Inalohu headed by the chief of Amet met Van Dicmen on the beach of 
Sirisori, fell at his feet, and asked for a general pardon, which was subse-
quently granted (Enkhuizen 399:87, 117, 129, 144, 145, 147, 148). 
On April 11, Van Diemcn departed from Saparua and, taking the 
channel between Saparua and Nusalaut, sailed to Lusicla on Hoamoal, 
where he arrived on the 13th. In Lusicla, a special envoy from Sultan 
Hamza of Ternatc, kaicili Sibori, who promised assistance in reconciling 
the affairs in the realm of Ternate, had recently an·ivcd. On the 17th, the 
Dutch started to demolish the remnants of the kimelaha's fortress. This 
took three days. On April 24, the fleet, including Lusiela's garrison, set 
sail for Hitu (Enkhuizcn 399:164, 165, 167, 171, 178, 182). In the mean-
time kaicili Sibori tried to induce kimelaha Leliato, who was in Kambelo 
on the other side of Hoamoal peninsula, to come to Luhu and receive an 
official letter from his overlord, Sultan Hamza. However, Leliato was 
afraid of being trapped by Sibori, who had appeared in Luhu 
accompanied by a few Dutch ships. Consequently, he requested that the 
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letter be handed over in Gamasongi, a little way inland from Luhu. 
Although Sibori considered this a token of disrespect to the Sultan, he 
decided to agree to Lcliato's request. However, before Sibori arrived in 
Gamasongi, Leliato quickly evacuated the place to retire to Kambelo. 
The only result of Sibori's attempts was that the subordinate villages of 
Luhu reaffirmed their obedience to the Sultan of Ternate by means of a 
solemn matakau (Enkhuizen 399: 171, 172, 181-185). 
On April 25, Van Diemen arrived in Hila on Hitu. In Hitu, the VOC's 
opponents had fortified themselves in two places, Wawani and 
Kapahaha. The most anti-Dutch were those of Wawani, which consisted 
of the uli of Nau-Binau, Leala, and Hatunuku, and parts of Sawani. In 
Kapahaha were concentrated those of uli Saylesi , who were more 
favorable toward reconciliation with the Dutch than those of Wawani. 
From the beginning of the crisis, Wawani had demanded the release of 
Kakiali and Tamalesi as a precondition for any further negotiations. 
Finally, the Dutch decided to use this bait. Consequently, Kakiali, who 
had returned with Van Diemen and had once more offered his 
cooperation to appease Hitu, was transported with Tamalesi from 
Victoria to Hila one day before Van Diemen aJTived there (Enkhuizcn 
399:65, 67, 82, 176, 180, 183, 184). Through Latu Lisalaik, the leaders 
ofWawani sent word that they were prepared to meet with Van Diemen. 
Kakiali and Tamalesi were released on April 26. They departed 
immediately to Wawani, where all village chiefs gathered to prepare the 
delegation to the Governor-General. Tamalcsi also assisted in involving 
Kapahaha in the peace process. Finally, on May 3, the delegation from 
Wawani headed by Barus, acting perdana Nusatapi, presented itself to 
Van Diemen in Hila. On that occasion it was decided that the Hituese 
would also participate in the landdag at Castle Victoria that was 
scheduled for that very month. The next day, Van Dicmcn departed from 
Hila, taking with him Kakiali, whose fonnal release must wait for the 
landdag (Enkhuizen 399:186--189, 194-199). 
After a short visit to Larike, the Governor-General arrived at Castle 
Victoria on May 5. On the 16th, Van Diemen opened the /anddag, for 
which occasion most of the village chiefs of Ambon and Lease had gath-
ered in Kota Ambon at the castle (Enkhuizen 399:199, 200, 205). On the 
first day,3 all matters concerning the Christians of the island of Ambon 
were settled, with the exception of those of Alang, who were still 
opposed to reconciliation, whereas Lilibooy had made peace with the 
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VOC in the middle of April (Enkhuizen 399:170, 199; Karlsruhe 
480: 170r-v). At the second session of the landdag, which took place on 
the 18th, all matters concerning the Lease Islands and the coast of South 
Seram opposite them were put on the agenda. On this occasion, the 
inhabitants were promised that the services on the hongi would be 
limited to a maximum period of five weeks a year. If it was necessary to 
row longer, they would be paid for it. On that same day kaicili Sibori 
arrived from Hoamoal. He was confronted with the question of whether 
the Islamic villages of Ihamahu, Hatuhaha, and Latu and Hualoy on 
Seram were subject to the clove monopoly and compulsory labor for the 
VOC. This question was raised by Van Diemen because the villages 
concerned had expressed their ignorance about whom they were subject 
to: the Sultan or the VOC. A voiding a clear-cut answer about fonnal 
sovereignty, Sibori responded that it was the wish of the Sultan of 
Ternate for the villages to be obedient to the Governor of Ambon and 
not to heed the kime/aha (Karlsruhe 480: 170v-174v; Enkhuizen 
399:209, 210). 
At the third session on May 19, the Christians of the island of Ambon 
presented themselves once more before the Governor-General, handing 
over a petition in which they asked, among other things, for payment for 
purchasing their kora-kora, a decrease in compulsory labor, and better 
treatment on the hongi, in addition to guarantees of their land and fishing 
rights in the vicinity of Kota Ambon. Van Diemen bluntly refused any 
compensation for the purchase of the kora-kora, but limited the time of 
the hongi to a maximum of five weeks, just as he had done in the case of 
the Lease. He promised instructions forbidding maltreatment on the 
hongi and advised the village chiefs to voice their complaints if this ever 
happened again. Finally, Van Diemen promised to draw up more 
regulations concerning fishing and land rights. Besides responding to 
this petition, Van Diemen ordered the closing down of all Christian 
village schools. All Leitimorese who wanted religious education for their 
children had to send them to the school in Kota Ambon. A similar 
measure had also been taken in the Lease Islands. The village chiefs 
showed themselves by no means pleased with Van Diemen's new 
religious policy. Three days later, on the 22nd, all the chiefs of Ambon 
and Lease, with the exception of those of Hitu, who were not yet present, 
swore a solemn oath of allegiance to the Dutch Republic and the VOC. 
The oath of the Christians was taken on the Bible, while the Moslems 
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took theirs on the Koran (Rumph ius 1910: 175r-178r). 
In the meantime, there had been no progress in the relations between 
Hitu and the Dutch. The principal leaders showed no inclination to visit 
the Governor-General in Victoria. Therefore, on May 20, Van Diemen 
decided to grant Kakiali his full freedom. Kakiali was given a warm re-
ception by his followers on his definite return to Wawani, and the 
leaders there made a final resolution to attend the landdag (Rumphius 
1910:149; Enkhuizen 399:210,212, 213). On May 31, Kakiali attended 
the landdag, heading a delegation of 100 persons, not only from Hitu 
itself but also from Uring, Asilulu, Wakasihu, Tapi, Alang, and 
Lilibooy. Both parties quickly agreed to restore peace and renew old 
treaties. The Dutch were promised a monopoly in cloves, which meant 
that Hitu had to refrain from admitting foreign traders to its shores. In 
return Van Diemen allowed Hitu to restore its traditional govcmment. 
Kakiali became kapitan Hitu once more. Kayoan, perdana 
Tanahitumcscn, lost the position of kapitan Hitu and was given the 
honorary title orangkaya tua instead. Barus was officially restored as 
perdana Nusatapi in place of the old and ailing Latu Lisalaik, who had 
never wanted this position anyway. Soulisa was perdana Totohatu and 
Beraim-ela perdana Patih Tuban. The Hituese moreover declared that 
they were friends and not subjects of the Sultan of Tcrnate and that they 
did not have any claims to the villages of Uring, Asilulu, Larike, 
Wakasihu, Tapi , A lang, and Lilibooy. On June I , both the Hituese and 
their allies from the latter villages swore an oath of allegiance to the 
Dutch. Finally, the new VOC Governor, Johan Ottens, took an oath that 
he would protect and recognize the Hitucse as true friends and allies of 
the Dutch Republic (Karlsruhe 480: 179v-186r; Enkhuizen 399: 2 16). 
After Van Diemen had left Hoamoal on April 24, kaicili Sibori tried 
to work out some sort of an arrangement with kimelaha Leliato. About 
one week later, Sibori reported to Van Dicrncn that he had been able to 
hand over the letter of the Sultan to Leliato and his principal followers, 
who had come to Luhu for that purpose on April 29. During the first pmt 
of May, Sibori tried in vain to persuade Lelia to to attend the landdag at 
Victoria. Sibori was also unsuccessful in his attempts to ban foreign 
traders from the Ternatan dependencies . Therefore, Sibori believed that 
the only remedy to redress the situation would be military action. The 
kimelaha showed himself less inclined to give in again because he was 
now assisted by hundreds of anned foreigners, who had been arriving in 
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trading vessels during the last few months. The only thing that Sibori 
was able to do for the time being was to have the leaders of Luhu and a 
number of its subordinate villages swear an oath of allegiance to the 
Dutch on June 2. On the same day, at the ninth session, the landdag was 
officially closed, and presents were distributed to those who had most 
assisted Van Diemen in setting matters straight again. The biggest 
reward was for Luis Gomes, chief of Mardika, the champion of 
cooperation with the Dutch. On June 4, Van Diemen departed from 
Victoria, setting sail for Batavia (Enkhuizen 399:190-193, 207-209, 
218; Karlsmhe 480:186v-189v). 
Epilogue and Conclusions 
Van Diem en was fully aware of the fact that the process of making peace 
had only progressed halfway. Therefore, he decided to return to Ambon 
the next year, when he hoped to meet Sultan Hamza of Ternate. He was 
of the opinion that the problems in the Ternatan dependencies could only 
be settled through the personal intervention of the Sultan, because the 
kimelaha and his followers had not shown themselves inclined to listen 
to the envoys of the Sultan. Consequently, Van Diemen invited the 
Sultan to come to the Ambon Islands the next year. The meeting 
between Governor-General and Sultan took place according to plan, and 
the Ternatan dependencies were appeased for the time being. However, 
within five years large-scale warfare had broken out again, in particular 
with Hitu, where Kakiali tried to get rid of the Dutch with the help of 
Makassar. Luhu, who had finally replaced Leliato as kimelaha, tried to 
follow him in this respect, but was soon at a loss because of the lack of 
support from his subjects. In spite of Makassaresc assistance, Kakiali 's 
Hitu lost both the war and its independence. Concerning the other two 
territories between the realms of Temate and the Dutch, it can be said 
that Hatuhaha ceased to act independently after Van Diemen's 
expedition described above. Ihamahu kept quiet until the 1650s, when it 
cooperated with kimelaha Luhu 's successor, Majira, who espoused the 
same policy that Kakiali had espoused. In 1651, Majira joined a 
rebellion against Sultan Mandarsyah in Tcrnatc that was inspired by anti-
Dutch sentiment. However, Majira and his allies from Makassar were 
beaten. Consequently, all Ternatan dependencies in the Ambon Islands 
were finnly incorporated into Dutch territory by 1656. lhamahu's 
independent role had already ceased to exist, when the village fled from 
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its stronghold on Sapama to South Scram in 1653 (Rump hi us 1910: 150; 
Knaap 1987a:22, 23, 301). 
What factors caused Van Diemen to be successful and his enemies to 
be confronted with a failure? In a publication a few years ago, I 
mentioned four principal tools of Dutch control during the period 
following 1656, the period during which the Ambon Islands were firmly 
incorporated into the VOC state: (a) securing military predominance; (b) 
locating the population in sites that were easily controlled; (c) exploiting 
the divisions within the indigenous society; (d) building a certain degree 
of consensus with at least some part of the subject population (Knaap 
1987a:29-33 ). During the crisis of the mid-1630s, all these factors were 
either present or at least emerging. 
As far as the military situation was concemed, it is clear that the 
VOC's local garrison, about 500 strong, was unable to cope with a seri-
ous crisis if the hongi were not available for action. In such cases, extra 
forces had to be mobilized from Batavia to save the day. This was what 
happened in Van Dicmcn's case. Through a combination of actual 
fighting and the threatened use of force, a substantial portion of the 
resistance was neutralized. The fact that the Dutch possessed a standing 
army and navy meant they had a clear advantage over the kimelaha. 
Leliato's defense system consisted of two elements. First, he mobilized 
the population of the Tematan dependencies to man the hongi or to build 
and defend his fortresses . Second, he received help from foreign Asian 
traders. However, both elements had their shortcomings. The population 
of his dependencies could not be mobilized for a longer period. At best, 
they functioned as a militia for a few months. The foreign traders were 
not a pennanent force either; after a few months they sailed away to their 
homeland. Besides having a standing army and navy, the VOC was also 
better equipped. Its capital ships were an almost insurmountable hurdle 
for kora-kora. Furthermore, the Dutch possessed more small arms and 
more artillery. 
In 1637, the policy of locating the population in places that were 
easily accessible for control had not yet fully materialized. As we have 
seen, this was one of Van Diem en's obvious aims in Lei timor, Hitu, and 
Hamku. It was finally achieved during the wars of the 1640s and 1650s. 
The third factor, divide and mle, was also clearly visible, although the 
situation was not yet as advanced as during the second half of the 
century, when almost every autonomous extravillage organization was 
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abolished. In 1637, the Dutch still tolerated the principle of central mle 
for Hitu and had not yet questioned the principle of some sort of 
Ternatan overlordship in Hoamoal and the islands to the west of it. On 
the other hand, already existing divisions in Hitu and the dependencies 
of Ternate were eagerly exploited to weaken the anti-Dutch front. The 
fourth and final element, building a consensus with part of the 
population, was a factor that had obviously broken down during the first 
half of the 1630s. Religion, in particular Protestantism, had not proved 
to be the cement that had linked mler and mled together in Leitimor and 
the Lease. Ambonese Protestantism was still recent and only nominally 
adhered to. Harsh treatment, as well as excessively burdensome 
compulsory labor, had laid too many strains on this kind of solidarity 
between mler and mled. 
Finally, the topic of unity or disunity among the Ambonese, 
including their Ternatan overlords, must be reviewed. First, it should be 
said that Ternatan mle was relatively recent and consequently less finnly 
rooted than one might have expected. The fact that the kime/aha's own 
military potential was relatively weak made legitimation and consensus 
important elements in his political survival. It is clear that Leliato had a 
problem with legitimation because the Sultan of Ternate did not give 
him his support. As far as consensus is concerned, one might say that he 
was supported by the population of Hoamoal and the islands to the west 
of it, because he had espoused the same cause in his opposition to Dutch 
aspirations concerning a clove monopoly, interference in the free move-
ment of trade and shipping, and, to a certain extent, Dutch discrimination 
against Islam. These factors made his power base fragile. Consequently, 
at certain moments in time, a considerable number of subjects 
temporarily chose the other side. If it was not Luhu, then it was 
Kambelo; if it was not Kambelo, then it was Manipa, in a continuous 
process. Indigenous Ambonese state formation was not very old either. 
Therefore, internal stability was not always guaranteed. On the level of 
uli (village federations), instability was less visible, but larger entities, 
such as Hitu and Luhu (federations of uli) showed considerable disunity. 
In Luhu's case, this even led to its loss of independence to Ternate. In 
Hitu's case, the crisis of the mid-1630s showed three rival factions: (a) 
the more-or-less pro-Dutch groups, (b) the extremely anti-Dutch 
majority on Wawani, and (c) the relatively moderate party on Kapahaha 
(Knaap 1987a:l0, II, 20, 21). 
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From a structural point of view, the preconditions for Ambonese 
unity were not ideal. On the other hand, one could imagine that 
discontent with the Dutch might have worked as a catalyst to stimulate 
unity. We have seen, however, that the anti-Dutch front of the mid-
1630s proved a failure. One of the main reasons was of course the 
kimelaha's inability to mobilize a military force as impressive as that of 
Van Diemen's, which might have given adequate protection to his new 
allies. To be "allies" and not "subjects" of the kimelaha was the aim of 
the discontented. Consequently, in reality the anti-Dutch front was only 
a loose conglomerate of self-interested parties. Heavily divided Hitu kept 
contact with the kimelaha and was willing to receive supplies of arms, 
but hardly ever joined in his military campaigns. The Hituese were not 
seen either defending Lusiela or on expedition in the Lease with Leliato. 
There was military cooperation between the faction of Wawani and the 
rebels in the western part of the island of Ambon, such as Wakasihu, 
Alang, and so forth, but this was an exception. The conclusion is that a 
large part of Hitu was not really interested in close cooperation with 
other parties. A similar reluctance to join hands with Leliato could be 
noticed in Ihamahu, Hatuhaha, and the Christian rebels on Saparua. They 
joined the action only after Leliato had taken the offensive against 
nearby places such as Tuhaha and the VOC fortress on Haruku 
(Rumphius 1910:127; Enkhuizen 399:53,99, 150). 
All the cases of linkage between kimelaha Lelia to and the anti-Dutch 
groups of Ambon and Lease concerned alliance and not subjugation. 
Relatively "warm" alliances were those between the rebels of Hamku 
and Nusalaut and those of the western corner of the island of Ambon. 
The Christians of Leitimor and Saparua proved less close cooperators. 
Among the rebels themselves, there were "wann" and less "warm" 
alliances. Those of Saparua and of the western part of the island of 
Ambon were relatively isolated from the rest. Only between those of 
Leitimor and Haruku, and those of Leitimor and Nusalaut, does there 
seem to have been a stronger bond, with the leaders of Haruku and 
Nusalaut carefully watching what such people as the chiefs of Kilang 
and Soya were doing (Enkhuizen 399:87, 117, 129, 145, 159, 160). 
The anti-Dutch front was an occasional coalition of political entities, 
which were not inclined to give away to each other the little room for 
maneuvering that they possessed. There was only a "negative" 
motivation to unify, namely, being anti-Dutch. Positive motivations, 
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such as a common identity (being Amboncse), or a common ideology 
(Islam), were nonexistent or not strong enough to fmm a lasting union. 
Ambonese "ethnogenesis," a concept used by Bartels to mean a process 
in which the societies of the islands were gradually tied together, among 
other things by bonds of pela (intervillage alliances aimed at mutual help 
during crisis situations), was apparently not important in this period 
(Bartels 1977: 131, 132). Elements of belonging to the uti lima or the 
ulisiwa social classifications did not play a substantial role in choosing 
sides either (van Fraassen 1987, vol. 2:462-470). A long tradition of 
intcr-Ambonese warfare, inspired or not inspired by Portuguese/Dutch 
and Tematan rivalry and intervention, had created too much mutual 
distrust. So when Van Diemen arrived, the anti-Dutch front fell apart 
piece by piece. Usually, the decision to reverse loyalty was taken after 
thorough intemal consultation and discussion. One did not want to bet 
on the wrong horse again. 
NOTES 
1. I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs. J. Steendijk-Kuypers in Utrecht, who 
rediscovered the manuscript of Governor-General Anthonie van Diemen's 
"Journael" of the expedition to Ambo ina in 163 7. The "Journael" was kept 
in the Regional Archives of West-Friesland in Hoom (Oud Archief 
Enkhuizen 399), instead of being transferred to the Algemeen Rijksarchief 
(ARA), the General State Archives, in The Hague as happened with the rest 
of the records of the Enkhuizen branch of the Verenigde Oost-lndische 
Compagnie (VOC), the Dutch East India Company. Until Mrs. Steendijk's 
rediscovery, it was believed that the copy of the manuscript in the Badische 
Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe, Gern1any, was the only surviving one and 
that there was no copy available in the Netherlands (Colenbrander 
1899b:iv). Mrs. Steendijk was kind enough to offer me her transcription of 
the Hoorn manuscript. It is one of the main sources for the history of 
Ambonese-Dutch relations in 1636-1637. The manuscript is referred to as 
"Enkhuizen 399." In the manuscript itself, there is no pagination. When 
Mrs. Steendijk made the transcription, she made a pagination for herself 
that runs exactly parallel to the original. I have used this pagination when 
referring to speci fie sections of the text. 
2. For the developments of 1636, I also used a source from the VOC archive 
in the ARA, notably the "Dagregister" of Jochum Roelofsz. van Deutecom, 
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which records events from December 4, 1634, w1til January 31, 1637 (VOC 
1124: 100r-240v). 
3. An extensive report of the sessions of the landdag can be found in the 
Badische Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe in the collection Karlsruher Hand-
schriften 480: 169r-189v, which will be referred to as "Karlsruhe 480." A 
microfilm of this manuscript is kept in the ARA in The Hague. 
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Introduction 
Maluku Province (or the Moluccas) located in eastern Indonesia, is a 
vast archipelagic area comprised of more than a thousand islands 
straddlh1g the Equator. With a population of about I ,850,000 people 
spread over an area the size of the States of Washington, Oregon, and 
California combined, but with only I 0% as land mass, it is easy to 
appreciate some of the dif{iculties experienced by these people. 
Transportation and communication is a challenge second only to the task 
of providing adequate health and social services to the populace. 1 
This report provides the results and analysis of a health and immuni-
zation coverage survey conducted by Project Concern International/ 
Indonesia in the Province of Maluku, Indonesia, in November 199P 
The survey was conducted to derive baseline data in order to evaluate the 
maternal and child health situation for development planning and to de-
termine targets for project objectives. 
Methods 
The Province of Maluku comprises 56 kecamatan (subdistricts) with a 
total population of 1,852,700. Due to the remoteness of a large 
proportion of the population, the province was arbitrarily divided into 
two separate stages for the implementation of activities. Area I, covering 
32 kecamatan is considered easy to access; whereas Area II, with the 
remaining 24 kecamatan and about 28% of the population, is generally 
more remote and geographically more difficult to access. 
